Francesc Dilmé´s website
Welcome to my webpage. I am Francesc Dilmé, an Associate Professor (with tenure) at the University of Bonn. I do research in Microeconomic Theory, with a particular emphasis on dynamic games, communication, and bargaining. See my CV for further details. My email is fdilme@uni-bonn.de.
I have been awarded an ERC starting grant, "Information Transmission in Markets," which runs from 2021 to 2026.
List of publications
- Repeated Trade with Imperfect Information about Previous Transactions (Online Appendix) (forthcoming), accepted at Theoretical Economics
- Sequentially Stable Outcomes (forthcoming), accepted at Econometrica.
- Communication between Unbiased Agents (2023), Games and Economic Behavior, 142: 613-622 (previous version).
- Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings (2023), Econometrica, 91(3), 1025-1075 (Online Appendix) (joint with Daniel Garrett).
- Bargaining in Small Dynamic Markets (2023), Journal of Economic Theory, 207.
- A Characterization of Consistent Assessments using Power Sequences of Strategy Profiles (2023), International Journal of Game Theory.
- Robust Information Transmission (2023), American Economic Review - Insights, 5(1), 111-124 (previous version).
- Strategic Communication with a Small Conflict of Interest (2022), Games and Economic Behavior, 134, 1-19.
- Revenue Management without Commitment (2019), Review of Economic Studies, 86(5): 1999-2034 (joint with Fei Li).
- Residual Deterrence (2019), Journal of the European Economic Association, 17(5), 1654-1686 (joint with Daniel Garrett) (Online Appendix).
- Pre-Trade Private Investments (2019), Games and Economic Behavior, 117: 89-119 (previous version).
- Reputation Building through Costly Adjustment (2019), Journal of Economic Theory, 181: 586-626.
- Dynamic Quality Signaling with Hidden Actions (2019), Games and Economic Behavior, 113: 116-136.
- Noisy Signaling in Discrete Time (2017), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 66: 13-25.
- Helping Behavior in Large Societies (2016), International Economic Review, 57.4: 1261-1278.
- Dynamic Signaling with Dropout Risk (2016), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8(1): 57-82 (joint with Fei Li).
List working papers
- A Dynamic Theory of Random Price Discounts (R&R at the Review of Economic Studies, joint with Daniel Garrett, Online Appendix)
- Precision vs Complexity: Efficient Communication and Optimal Codes (Online Appendix)
- Lexicographic Numbers in Extensive Form Games
- The Role of Discounting in Bargaining with Private Information
- Limit-of-Finite Equilibria in Infinite Normal-Form Games
- Bargaining with Private Binary Information
- Iterated Exclusion of Implausible Types in Signaling Games