In here I present some haikus of my papers, I hope you like them. The idea comes from Heski Bar-Isaac's page (with his permission). You can also find a statement of my research by clicking this link.

14.​- Communication between Unbiased Agents (2023), Games and Economic Behavior, 142: 613-622 (previous version).

How cheap talk looks like

between skewed agents?

Very imprecise.

13.- Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings (2023), Econometrica, 91(3), 1025-1075 (Online Appendix) (joint with Daniel Garrett).

How firms can induce

their workers to not save much?

Informal contracts.

12.- Bargaining in Small Dynamic Markets (2023), Journal of Economic Theory, 207.

If markets are thin,

each trader is important:

delay may arise.

11.- A Characterization of Consistent Assessments using Power Sequences of Strategy Profiles (2023), International Journal of Game Theory.

Which good assessments

power sequences' limits?

Every one of them.

10.- Robust Information Transmission (2023), American Economic Review - Insights, 5(1), 111-124 (previous version).

Which kind of cheap talk 

persists when there are small costs?

That which is precise.

9.- Strategic Communication with a Small Conflict of Interest (2022), Games and Economic Behavior, 134, 1-19.

When bias is small

communication is good,

and fully described.

8.- Revenue Management without Commitment: Dynamic Pricing and Periodic Flash Sales (2019), Review of Economic Studies, 86(5): 1999-2034 (joint with Fei Li)

If buyers can wait, 

then how to sell plane tickets?

Some times run flash sales.

7.​- Residual Deterrence (2019), Journal of the European Economic Association, 17(5) (joint with Daniel Garrett) (Online Appendix) (CEPR version here.)

Why post-conviction,

crime rate goes down and then up?

Deterrence explained.

6.- Pre-Trade Private Investments (2019), Games and Economic Behavior, 117: 98-119 (previous version).

If assets are veiled,

adding buyers spreads price,

and makes trade less good.

5.- Reputation Building through Costly Adjustment (2019), Journal of Economic Theory, 181: 586-626.

Changes are costly

so quality's persistent:

Reputation built.

4.- Dynamic Quality Signaling with Hidden Actions (2019), Games and Economic Behavior, 113: 116-136.

How best plan effort 

to signal high value firm?

High if bleak market.

3.- Noisy Signaling in Discrete Time (2017), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 66: 13-25.

Before buyers come

seller pretends being good.

Devil's staircase...

2.- Helping Behavior in Large Societies (2016)​, International Economic Review, 57.4: 1261-1278.

How can, in big groups,

helping strangers be boosted?

Playing tit-for-tat.

1.- Dynamic Signaling with Dropout Risk (2016), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8(1): 57-82 (joint with Fei Li).

Students drop out

because they can and have to.

Dynamics obtained.

- A Dynamic Theory of Random Price Discounts (joint with Daniel Garrett, R&R at American Economic Review) (previous version)

When to discount price 

if buyers are risk averse?


- Optimal Languages (submitted)

Words are different,

how to assign them meaning?

All same precision.

- Lexicographic Numbers and Stability in Extensive Form Games (work in progress)

Techniques provided

to find good outcomes in games.

Still work in progress...

- The Role of Discounting in Bargaining with One-Sided Offers (work in progress)

How does impatience

affect buyers gain from trade?

Makes them better off.

- Sequential Bargaining with Signals (work in progress)

Internet cookies:

good or bad for the buyers?

Good if not precise.