Francesc Dilmé´s website

Welcome to my webpage. I am Francesc Dilmé, an Associate Professor (with tenure) at the University of Bonn. I do research in Microeconomic Theory, with a particular emphasis on dynamic games, communication, and bargaining. See my CV for further details. My email is

I have been awarded an ERC starting grant, "Information Transmission in Markets," which runs from 2021 to 2026.

List of publications

14.​- Communication between Unbiased Agents (2023), Games and Economic Behavior, 142: 613-622 (previous version).

13.- Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings (2023), Econometrica, 91(3), 1025-1075 (Online Appendix) (joint with Daniel Garrett).

12.- Bargaining in Small Dynamic Markets (2023), Journal of Economic Theory, 207.

11.- A Characterization of Consistent Assessments using Power Sequences of Strategy Profiles (2023), International Journal of Game Theory.

10.- Robust Information Transmission (2023), American Economic Review - Insights, 5(1), 111-124 (previous version).

9.- Strategic Communication with a Small Conflict of Interest (2022), Games and Economic Behavior, 134, 1-19.

​​8.- Revenue Management without Commitment (2019), Review of Economic Studies, 86(5): 1999-2034 (joint with Fei Li).

7.- Residual Deterrence (2019), Journal of the European Economic Association, 17(5), 1654-1686 (joint with Daniel Garrett) (Online Appendix).

6.- Pre-Trade Private Investments (2019), Games and Economic Behavior, 117: 89-119 (previous version).

5.- Reputation Building through Costly Adjustment (2019), Journal of Economic Theory, 181: 586-626.

4.- Dynamic Quality Signaling with Hidden Actions (2019), Games and Economic Behavior, 113: 116-136.

3.- Noisy Signaling in Discrete Time (2017), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 66: 13-25.

2.- Helping Behavior in Large Societies (2016)​, International Economic Review, 57.4: 1261-1278.

1.- Dynamic Signaling with Dropout Risk (2016), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8(1): 57-82 (joint with Fei Li).

List working papers

15.- A Dynamic Theory of Random Price Discounts (R&R at the Review of Economic Studies, joint with Daniel Garrett, Online Appendix)

16.- Sequentially Stable Outcomes (R&R at the Econometrica)

17.- Repeated Bargaining with Imperfect Information about Previous Transactions (Online Appendix) (R&R at Theoretical Economics)

18.- Precision vs Complexity: Efficient Communication and Optimal Codes (Online Appendix)

​19.- Lexicographic Numbers in Extensive Form Games

20.- ​The Role of Discounting in Bargaining with Private Information

21.- Discretizability of Infinite Games

22.- Bargaining with Private Binary Information

23.- Iterated Exclusion of Implausible Types in Signaling Games