Francesc Dilmé´s website

Welcome to my webpage. I am Francesc Dilmé, an Associate Professor (with tenure) at the University of Bonn. I do research in Microeconomic Theory, with a particular emphasis on dynamic models with asymmetric information and communication. See my CV for further details. My email is

I have been awarded an ERC starting grant, "Information Transmission in Markets," which runs from 2021 to 2026.

List of publications

12.- Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings (2023), Econometrica, 91(3), 1025-1075 (Online Appendix) (joint with Daniel Garrett).

11.- Bargaining in Small Dynamic Markets (2023), Journal of Economic Theory, 207.

10.- Robust Information Transmission (2023), American Economic Review - Insights, 5(1), 111-124 (previous version).

9.- Strategic Communication with a Small Conflict of Interest (2022), Games and Economic Behavior, 134, 1-19.

​​8.- Revenue Management without Commitment (2019), Review of Economic Studies, 86(5): 1999-2034 (joint with Fei Li).

7.- Residual Deterrence (2019), Journal of the European Economic Association, 17(5) (joint with Daniel Garrett) (Online Appendix) (CEPR version here).

6.- Pre-Trade Private Investments (2019), Games and Economic Behavior, 117: 89-119 (previous version).

5.- Reputation Building through Costly Adjustment (2019), Journal of Economic Theory, 181: 586-626.

4.- Dynamic Quality Signaling with Hidden Actions (2019), Games and Economic Behavior, 113: 116-136.

3.- Noisy Signaling in Discrete Time (2017), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 66: 13-25.

2.- Helping Behavior in Large Societies (2016)​, International Economic Review, 57.4: 1261-1278.

1.- Dynamic Signaling with Dropout Risk (2016), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8(1): 57-82 (joint with Fei Li).

List working papers

13.- A Dynamic Theory of Random Price Discounts (R&R at the Review of Economic Studies, joint with Daniel Garrett, Online Appendix)

14.​- Communication between Unbiased Agents (previous version, accepted the Games and Economic Behavior)

15.- Sequentially Stable Outcomes (R&R at the Econometrica)

16.- Repeated Bargaining with Imperfect Information about Previous Transactions (Online Appendix) (R&R at Theoretical Economics)

17.- A Characterization of Consistent Assessments using Power Sequences of Strategy Profiles (accepted at International Journal of Game Theory)

18.- Optimal Languages (work in progress)

​19.- Lexicographic Numbers in Extensive Form Games (work in progress)

20.- ​The Role of Discounting in Bargaining with One-Sided Offers (work in progress)

21.- Discretizability of Infinite Games (work in progress)