Haikus of my Research Works
In here I present some haikus of my papers, I hope you like them. The idea comes from Heski Bar-Isaac's page (with his permission). You can also find a statement of my research by clicking this link.
- Revenue Management without Commitment: Dynamic Pricing and Periodic Flash Sales (2019), Review of Economic Studies, 86(5): 1999-2034 (joint with Fei Li)
If buyers can wait,
then how to sell plane tickets?
Some times run flash sales.
- Residual Deterrence (2019), Journal of the European Economic Association, 17(5) (joint with Daniel Garrett) (Online Appendix) (CEPR version here.)
Why post-conviction,
crime rate goes down and then up?
Deterrence explained.
- Pre-Trade Private Investments (2019), Games and Economic Behavior, 117: 98-119 (previous version).
If assets are veiled,
adding buyers spreads price,
and makes trade less good.
- Reputation Building through Costly Adjustment (2019), Journal of Economic Theory, 181: 586-626.
Changes are costly
so quality's persistent:
Reputation built.
- Dynamic Quality Signaling with Hidden Actions (2019), Games and Economic Behavior, 113: 116-136.
How best plan effort
to signal high value firm?
High if bleak market.
- Noisy Signaling in Discrete Time (2017), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 66: 13-25.
Before buyers come
seller pretends being good.
Devil's staircase...
- Helping Behavior in Large Societies (2016), International Economic Review, 57.4: 1261-1278.
How can, in big groups,
helping strangers be boosted?
Playing tit-for-tat.
- Dynamic Signaling with Dropout Risk (2016), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8(1): 57-82 (joint with Fei Li).
Students drop out
because they can and have to.
Dynamics obtained.
- A Dynamic Theory of Random Price Discounts (joint with Daniel Garrett, R&R at American Economic Review) (previous version)
When to discount price
if buyers are risk averse?
Independently!
- Skewed Information Transmission (previous version, submitted)
How cheap talk looks like
between skewed agents?
Very imprecise.
- Bargaining and Delay in Thin Markets (submitted)
If markets are thin,
each trader is important:
delay may arise.
- Optimal Languages (submitted)
Words are different,
how to assign them meaning?
All same precision.
- Strategic Communication with a Small Conflict of Interest (submitted)
When bias is small
communication is good,
and fully described.
- Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings (joint with Daniel Garrett)
How firms can induce
their workers to not save much?
Informal contracts.
- Likelihood Assignments in Extensive-Form Games (work in progress)
Techniques provided
to find good outcomes in games.
Still work in progress...
- Robust Information Transmission (work in progress)
Which kind of cheap talk
persists when there are small costs?
That which is precise.
- The Role of Discounting in Bargaining with One-Sided Offers (work in progress)
How does impatience
affect buyers gain from trade?
Makes them better off.
- Sequential Bargaining with Signals (work in progress)
Internet cookies:
good or bad for the buyers?
Good if not precise.
If buyers can wait,
then how to sell plane tickets?
Some times run flash sales.
- Residual Deterrence (2019), Journal of the European Economic Association, 17(5) (joint with Daniel Garrett) (Online Appendix) (CEPR version here.)
Why post-conviction,
crime rate goes down and then up?
Deterrence explained.
- Pre-Trade Private Investments (2019), Games and Economic Behavior, 117: 98-119 (previous version).
If assets are veiled,
adding buyers spreads price,
and makes trade less good.
- Reputation Building through Costly Adjustment (2019), Journal of Economic Theory, 181: 586-626.
Changes are costly
so quality's persistent:
Reputation built.
- Dynamic Quality Signaling with Hidden Actions (2019), Games and Economic Behavior, 113: 116-136.
How best plan effort
to signal high value firm?
High if bleak market.
- Noisy Signaling in Discrete Time (2017), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 66: 13-25.
Before buyers come
seller pretends being good.
Devil's staircase...
- Helping Behavior in Large Societies (2016), International Economic Review, 57.4: 1261-1278.
How can, in big groups,
helping strangers be boosted?
Playing tit-for-tat.
- Dynamic Signaling with Dropout Risk (2016), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8(1): 57-82 (joint with Fei Li).
Students drop out
because they can and have to.
Dynamics obtained.
- A Dynamic Theory of Random Price Discounts (joint with Daniel Garrett, R&R at American Economic Review) (previous version)
When to discount price
if buyers are risk averse?
Independently!
- Skewed Information Transmission (previous version, submitted)
How cheap talk looks like
between skewed agents?
Very imprecise.
- Bargaining and Delay in Thin Markets (submitted)
If markets are thin,
each trader is important:
delay may arise.
- Optimal Languages (submitted)
Words are different,
how to assign them meaning?
All same precision.
- Strategic Communication with a Small Conflict of Interest (submitted)
When bias is small
communication is good,
and fully described.
- Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings (joint with Daniel Garrett)
How firms can induce
their workers to not save much?
Informal contracts.
- Likelihood Assignments in Extensive-Form Games (work in progress)
Techniques provided
to find good outcomes in games.
Still work in progress...
- Robust Information Transmission (work in progress)
Which kind of cheap talk
persists when there are small costs?
That which is precise.
- The Role of Discounting in Bargaining with One-Sided Offers (work in progress)
How does impatience
affect buyers gain from trade?
Makes them better off.
- Sequential Bargaining with Signals (work in progress)
Internet cookies:
good or bad for the buyers?
Good if not precise.
