Haikus of my Research Works
In here I present some haikus of my papers, I hope you like them. The idea comes from Heski Bar-Isaac's page (with his permission). You can also find a statement of my research by clicking this link.
- Revenue Management without Commitment: Dynamic Pricing and Periodic Flash Sales (2019), Review of Economic Studies, 86(5): 1999-2034 (joint with Fei Li)
If buyers can wait,
then how to sell plane tickets?
Some times run flash sales.
- Residual Deterrence (2019), Journal of the European Economic Association, 17(5) (joint with Daniel Garrett) (Online Appendix) (CEPR version here.)
Why post-conviction,
crime rate goes down and then up?
Deterrence explained.
- Pre-Trade Private Investments (2019), Games and Economic Behavior, 117: 98-119 (previous version).
If assets are veiled,
adding buyers spreads price,
and makes trade less good.
- Reputation Building through Costly Adjustment (2019), Journal of Economic Theory, 181: 586-626.
Changes are costly
so quality's persistent:
Reputation built.
- Dynamic Quality Signaling with Hidden Actions (2019), Games and Economic Behavior, 113: 116-136.
How best plan effort
to signal high value firm?
High if bleak market.
- Noisy Signaling in Discrete Time (2017), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 66: 13-25.
Before buyers come
seller pretends being good.
Devil's staircase...
- Helping Behavior in Large Societies (2016), International Economic Review, 57.4: 1261-1278.
How can, in big groups,
helping strangers be boosted?
Playing tit-for-tat.
- Dynamic Signaling with Dropout Risk (2016), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8(1): 57-82 (joint with Fei Li).
Students drop out
because they can and have to.
Dynamics obtained.
- A Dynamic Theory of Random Price Discounts (joint with Daniel Garrett, R&R at American Economic Review) (previous version)
When to discount price
if buyers are risk averse?
Independently!
- Skewed Information Transmission (previous version, submitted)
How cheap talk looks like
between skewed agents?
Very imprecise.
- Bargaining and Delay in Thin Markets (submitted)
If markets are thin,
each trader is important:
delay may arise.
- Optimal Languages (submitted)
Words are different,
how to assign them meaning?
All same precision.
- Strategic Communication with a Small Conflict of Interest (submitted)
When bias is small
communication is good,
and fully described.
- Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings (joint with Daniel Garrett)
How firms can induce
their workers to not save much?
Informal contracts.
- Likelihood Assignments in Extensive-Form Games (work in progress)
Techniques provided
to find good outcomes in games.
Still work in progress...
If buyers can wait,
then how to sell plane tickets?
Some times run flash sales.
- Residual Deterrence (2019), Journal of the European Economic Association, 17(5) (joint with Daniel Garrett) (Online Appendix) (CEPR version here.)
Why post-conviction,
crime rate goes down and then up?
Deterrence explained.
- Pre-Trade Private Investments (2019), Games and Economic Behavior, 117: 98-119 (previous version).
If assets are veiled,
adding buyers spreads price,
and makes trade less good.
- Reputation Building through Costly Adjustment (2019), Journal of Economic Theory, 181: 586-626.
Changes are costly
so quality's persistent:
Reputation built.
- Dynamic Quality Signaling with Hidden Actions (2019), Games and Economic Behavior, 113: 116-136.
How best plan effort
to signal high value firm?
High if bleak market.
- Noisy Signaling in Discrete Time (2017), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 66: 13-25.
Before buyers come
seller pretends being good.
Devil's staircase...
- Helping Behavior in Large Societies (2016), International Economic Review, 57.4: 1261-1278.
How can, in big groups,
helping strangers be boosted?
Playing tit-for-tat.
- Dynamic Signaling with Dropout Risk (2016), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8(1): 57-82 (joint with Fei Li).
Students drop out
because they can and have to.
Dynamics obtained.
- A Dynamic Theory of Random Price Discounts (joint with Daniel Garrett, R&R at American Economic Review) (previous version)
When to discount price
if buyers are risk averse?
Independently!
- Skewed Information Transmission (previous version, submitted)
How cheap talk looks like
between skewed agents?
Very imprecise.
- Bargaining and Delay in Thin Markets (submitted)
If markets are thin,
each trader is important:
delay may arise.
- Optimal Languages (submitted)
Words are different,
how to assign them meaning?
All same precision.
- Strategic Communication with a Small Conflict of Interest (submitted)
When bias is small
communication is good,
and fully described.
- Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings (joint with Daniel Garrett)
How firms can induce
their workers to not save much?
Informal contracts.
- Likelihood Assignments in Extensive-Form Games (work in progress)
Techniques provided
to find good outcomes in games.
Still work in progress...
