Who am I?
Welcome to my webpage. I am Francesc Dilmé, an Associate Professor (with tenure) at the University of Bonn. I do research in Applied Microeconomic Theory, with a particular emphasis in dynamic models with asymmetric information and communication. See my CV for further details.
I have been awarded an ERC starting grant, "Information Transmission in Markets", which runs from 2021 to 2026.
I have been awarded an ERC starting grant, "Information Transmission in Markets", which runs from 2021 to 2026.
List of my research work
10.- Robust Information Transmission (previous version (accepted at American Economic Review - Insights).
9.- Strategic Communication with a Small Conflict of Interest (accepted at Games and Economic Behavior).
8.- Revenue Management without Commitment (2019), Review of Economic Studies, 86(5): 1999-2034 (joint with Fei Li).
7.- Residual Deterrence (2019), Journal of the European Economic Association, 17(5) (joint with Daniel Garrett) (Online Appendix) (CEPR version here.)
6.- Pre-Trade Private Investments (2019), Games and Economic Behavior, 117: 89-119 (previous version)
5.- Reputation Building through Costly Adjustment (2019), Journal of Economic Theory, 181: 586-626.
4.- Dynamic Quality Signaling with Hidden Actions (2019), Games and Economic Behavior, 113: 116-136.
3.- Noisy Signaling in Discrete Time (2017), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 66: 13-25.
2.- Helping Behavior in Large Societies (2016), International Economic Review, 57.4: 1261-1278.
1.- Dynamic Signaling with Dropout Risk (2016), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8(1): 57-82 (joint with Fei Li).
11.- Relational contracts: Public versus private savings (joint with Daniel Garrett, R&R at Econometrica) (Online Appendix)
12.- Bargaining in Small Dynamic Markets (R&R at Journal of Economic Theory)
13.- A Dynamic Theory of Random Price Discounts (R&R at the Review of Economic Studies, joint with Daniel Garrett)
14.- Skewed Information Transmission (previous version, R&R at the Games and Economic Behavior)
15.- Optimal Languages (submitted)
16.- Lexicographic Numbers in Extensive Form Games (work in progress)
17.- The Role of Discounting in Bargaining with One-Sided Offers (work in progress)
18.- Repeated bargaining with imperfect information about previous transactions (work in progress)
19.- Sequential Stable Outcomes (work in progress)
20.- A characterization of consistent assessments using power sequences of strategy profiles (work in progress)
9.- Strategic Communication with a Small Conflict of Interest (accepted at Games and Economic Behavior).
8.- Revenue Management without Commitment (2019), Review of Economic Studies, 86(5): 1999-2034 (joint with Fei Li).
7.- Residual Deterrence (2019), Journal of the European Economic Association, 17(5) (joint with Daniel Garrett) (Online Appendix) (CEPR version here.)
6.- Pre-Trade Private Investments (2019), Games and Economic Behavior, 117: 89-119 (previous version)
5.- Reputation Building through Costly Adjustment (2019), Journal of Economic Theory, 181: 586-626.
4.- Dynamic Quality Signaling with Hidden Actions (2019), Games and Economic Behavior, 113: 116-136.
3.- Noisy Signaling in Discrete Time (2017), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 66: 13-25.
2.- Helping Behavior in Large Societies (2016), International Economic Review, 57.4: 1261-1278.
1.- Dynamic Signaling with Dropout Risk (2016), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8(1): 57-82 (joint with Fei Li).
11.- Relational contracts: Public versus private savings (joint with Daniel Garrett, R&R at Econometrica) (Online Appendix)
12.- Bargaining in Small Dynamic Markets (R&R at Journal of Economic Theory)
13.- A Dynamic Theory of Random Price Discounts (R&R at the Review of Economic Studies, joint with Daniel Garrett)
14.- Skewed Information Transmission (previous version, R&R at the Games and Economic Behavior)
15.- Optimal Languages (submitted)
16.- Lexicographic Numbers in Extensive Form Games (work in progress)
17.- The Role of Discounting in Bargaining with One-Sided Offers (work in progress)
18.- Repeated bargaining with imperfect information about previous transactions (work in progress)
19.- Sequential Stable Outcomes (work in progress)
20.- A characterization of consistent assessments using power sequences of strategy profiles (work in progress)
