Who am I?
Welcome to my webpage. I am Francesc Dilme, a Junior Professor at the University of Bonn. I do research in Applied Microeconomic Theory, with a particular emphasis in dynamic models with asymmetric information and communication. See my CV for further details.
Shortlist of my research work
8.- Revenue Management without Commitment (joint with Fei Li, accepted at Review of Economic Studies.)
7.- Residual Deterrence (Online Appendix) (joint with Daniel Garrett, forthcoming at Journal of the European Economic Association, early version here and CEPR version here.)
6.- Pre-Trade Private Investments (accepted at Games and Economic Behavior) (previous version)
5.- Reputation Building through Costly Adjustment (2019), Journal of Economic Theory, 181: 586-626.
4.- Dynamic Quality Signaling with Hidden Actions (2019), Games and Economic Behavior, 113: 116-136.
3.- Noisy Signaling in Discrete Time (2017), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 66: 13-25.
2.- Helping Behavior in Large Societies (2016), International Economic Review, 57.4: 1261-1278.
1.- Dynamic Signaling with Dropout Risk (2016), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8(1): 57-82 (joint with Fei Li).
9.- A Dynamic Theory of Random Price Discounts (joint with Daniel Garrett, R&R at American Economic Review)
10.- Bargaining and Delay in Thin Markets (submitted)
11.- Skewed Information Transmission (previous version, submitted)
12.- Optimal Languages (submitted)
13.- Strategic Communication with a Small Conflict of Interest (submitted)
14.- Likelihood Assignments in Extensive-Form Games (work in progress)
15.- Relational contracts: Public versus private savings (joint with Daniel Garrett, in the works)
7.- Residual Deterrence (Online Appendix) (joint with Daniel Garrett, forthcoming at Journal of the European Economic Association, early version here and CEPR version here.)
6.- Pre-Trade Private Investments (accepted at Games and Economic Behavior) (previous version)
5.- Reputation Building through Costly Adjustment (2019), Journal of Economic Theory, 181: 586-626.
4.- Dynamic Quality Signaling with Hidden Actions (2019), Games and Economic Behavior, 113: 116-136.
3.- Noisy Signaling in Discrete Time (2017), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 66: 13-25.
2.- Helping Behavior in Large Societies (2016), International Economic Review, 57.4: 1261-1278.
1.- Dynamic Signaling with Dropout Risk (2016), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8(1): 57-82 (joint with Fei Li).
9.- A Dynamic Theory of Random Price Discounts (joint with Daniel Garrett, R&R at American Economic Review)
10.- Bargaining and Delay in Thin Markets (submitted)
11.- Skewed Information Transmission (previous version, submitted)
12.- Optimal Languages (submitted)
13.- Strategic Communication with a Small Conflict of Interest (submitted)
14.- Likelihood Assignments in Extensive-Form Games (work in progress)
15.- Relational contracts: Public versus private savings (joint with Daniel Garrett, in the works)
